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2Deliberate ignorance in project risk management
The management of project risk is considered a key discipline by most organisations
involved in projects. Best practice project risk management processes are claimed to be
self-evidently correct. However, project risk management involves a choice between
which information is utilized and which is deemed to be irrelevant and hence excluded.
Little research has been carried out to ascertain the manifestation of barriers to optimal
project risk management such as ‘irrelevance’; the deliberate inattention of risk actors to
risk. This paper presents the results of a qualitative study of IT project managers,
investigating their reasons for deeming certain known risks to be irrelevant. The results
both confirm and expand on Smithson’s [1] taxonomy of ignorance and uncertainty and
in particular offer further context related insights into the phenomenon of ‘irrelevance’
in project risk management. We suggest that coping with ‘irrelevance’ requires defence
mechanisms, the effective management of relevance as well as the setting of, and
sticking to priorities.
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3INTRODUCTION
Institutions such as the Project Management Institute (PMI) and the Association of
Project Management (APM) promote ‘best’ practice project management standards.
Project risk management, as one of the key disciplines of project management, is
defined as the systematic process of identifying, analysing and responding to risk as
project-related events, or managerial behaviour, that is not definitely known in advance,
but that has potential for adverse consequences on a project objective [2]. Project risk
management claims to enable project managers to effectively manage risk related
information.
Raz and Michael [3] have investigated the extent to which project managers perceived
project risk management as effective. Specifically, they looked at an extensive range of
risk management techniques, rating each against a ‘project management performance’
index based on the responses to their survey. However, such evidence is scarce, often
descriptive and inchoate. In order to address some of these shortcomings, this study
investigates how ‘irrelevance’; the deliberate ignorance of risk related information,
manifests itself in the context of project risk management and how it constrains the
perceived effectiveness of project risk management. In doing so, we seek to add to the
debate on the effectiveness of risk management processes by considering the influence
of social and cognitive factors as intervening conditions in project risk management.
BEST PRACTICE IN PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
Risks potentially endanger the ability of the project manager to meet predefined project
objectives of scope, time and cost. This ultimately means that tasks may take longer
than planned with a negative consequence on the project manager’s fulfilment of the
project objectives [2]. Because of this potential to adversely influence a project’s
performance, the PMI acknowledges the management of risk as one of its nine key
4knowledge areas in its Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge [2].
According to Pender [4], this represents ‘best’ practice in the area of project
management.
Beyond the PMI standards, there are a number of other “best practice” project risk
management processes such as the British Standards Institute [5], the Office of
Government Commerce [6] or the UK Association for Project Management [7]. The
basic structure of all these models is similar. Table 1 gives an overview of the key
elements.
Table 1: Overview of main project risk management processes
Major steps in project risk
management
PMBOK - PMI risk management process
[2]
OGC – Management of risk
[9]
PRAM - APM risk management process
[12]
Planning Risk Management Planning Context Focus
Define
Identification Risk Identification Risk Identification Identify
Structure
Analysis Risk Analysis Assess - Estimate Estimate
Assess - Evaluate Evaluate
Response Risk Response Planning Plan
Implement
Communicate
Plan
Risk (Monitoring and) Control Ownership
Manage
Regardless of the number and definition of stages, the mentioned project risk
management processes have one element in common: “an activity that deals with
planning actions that will be implemented in order to reduce the exposure to risk” [8].
This principle activity can be subdivided into four major stages: planning, identification,
analysis, and response. Firstly, a project manager can apply risk management planning
to define what activities should be taken to approach project risks. Secondly, risk
identification allows project managers to single out risks that may affect the project
objectives. Thirdly, by using risk analysis a project manager evaluates quantitatively or
qualitatively the likely consequences of risks as well as the likelihood of occurrence [9].
5Fourthly, risk response helps a project manager to develop procedures and techniques to
mitigate the defined risks, and enables the project manager to keep track of these, to
identify new risks during the project and to implement risk response plans [2].
Best practice project management standards, as set out by the PMI and APM, indirectly
claim to be self-evidently effective. In this respect, Williams [10] argues:
“Project management as set out in this work is presented as a set of procedures
that are self-evidently correct: following these procedures will produce
effectively managed projects; project failure is indicative of inadequate attention
to the project management procedures.”
Project risk management processes such as those described have their foundation in
expected utility theorem (EUT) [7, 11]. Expected utility is “a weighted average of the
utilities of all the possible outcomes that could flow from a particular decision, where
higher-probability outcomes count more than lower-probability outcomes in calculating
the average” [12]. In other words, the utility of decision making choices are weighted
by their probabilities and outcomes [11, 13].
EUT has generally been accepted in the literature as a model of rational choice for
taking risky decisions [11, 12] and is considered a fruitful framework for decision-
making in situations where risk is a factor [14]. A key feature of EUT is the
presumption of rationality, or what Weber et al call ‘hyper rationality’ [15]. This
prevailing normative and explanatory framework in decision making under uncertainty
tends to ignore the absence or ‘distortion’ of truth. Hence, social influences are
downplayed. For example, ignorance is excluded.
6THE ROLE OF IGNORANCE IN PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
Recently, some attention has been paid to ignorance in various contexts [16, 17].
Research has increasingly concentrated on the pursuit of certainty and how to overcome
ignorance, which is often cited as a lack of ‘true’ knowledge [18]. Although this
definition deserves credit, developing a single definition would be inappropriate
because ignorance is a multidimensional concept with various facets (see
Figure 1). In particular, a useful distinction can be made between deliberate ignorance,
driven by social factors and/or conditioning, and ignorance as an affective impulse,
meaning it is beyond one’s control, both systemically and cognitively [19]. The concept
of error including its various sub-concepts (see
Table 2,
Figure 1), such as distortion, relates to the passive connotation of incomplete knowledge
(being ignorant). Perfect knowledge about the future state of an environment is not
possible and error will always occur despite attempts of correction through clarification
and exactitude. In contrast, deliberate ignoring is defined as irrelevance that may be
managed through the application of specific defence mechanisms [1]. It is not that
7information is missing or wrong (error), but rather that the presence of particular
information is not deemed important by stakeholders risk in a particular context. While
individuals have limited control over the extent of error, they have substantial control
over the extent to which they choose to regard risk information as being irrelevant.
Therefore, it is with irrelevance that we concern ourselves in this study (i.e. deliberate
ignorance) rather than error.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of ignorance [1]
Ignorance
Error Irrelevance
TabooUntopicality UndecidabilityIncomplete-nessDistortion
Confusion Inaccuracy Uncertainty Absence
ProbabilityVagueness Ambiguity
Fuzziness Nonspecifitciy
Table 2: Types of ignorance - meanings [1]
Term Meaning
1. Error
1.1. Distortion
1.1.1. Confusion Wrongful substitutions
1.1.2. Accuracy Bias and distortion in degree
81.2. Incompleteness
1.2.1. Uncertainty
1.2.1.1. Vagueness Non-crispness of belonging and non-belonging of
elements to a set or notion of interest
1.2.1.1.1. Fuzziness The quality of being indistinct
1.2.1.1.2. Nonspecificity Failure to indicate in sufficient detail to permit
identification
1.2.1.2. Probability Chances of outcomes
1.2.1.3. Ambiguity The possibility of having multi-outcomes of processes or
systems
1.2.2. Absence Incompleteness in kind
2. Irrelevance
2.1. Untopicality Intuitions of experts that could not be negotiated with
others in terms of cognitive relevance
2.2. Taboo Socially reinforced irrelevance. Issues that people must
not know, deal with, inquire about, or investigate
2.3. Undecidability Issues that can not be designated true or false because
they are considered insoluble, or solutions that are not
verifiable
The first, and most obvious kind of irrelevance is untopicability, referring to
information that is declared ‘off-topic’ resulting in a limiting the range of information
and risks that project managers deem pertinent to focus upon. Some literature on project
risk management refers to untopicability. For example, Margolis [20] argues: “experts
in general learn to concentrate on what is critical in their experience with the domain at
hand and ignore anything else.”
A further sub-concept is taboo. Taboos reflect a moral and/or cautionary restriction
placed on action based on what is deemed inappropriate [1, 21]. The process of project
risk management requires project manager to expose risks for the purpose of analysing
and responding to them. However, the exposure may also create anxiety among
stakeholders, and negative thoughts may be suppressed [22]. In an extreme case, the
exposure of risks may result in the cancellation of the project because stakeholders take
new risks into account and decide not to go ahead with a project that is now perceived
as too risky [23]. As a result, project managers may limit the degree to which they
9identify new risks. Risks, although legitimate, may then be suppressed during the risk
identification phase and ultimately ignored.
The final aspect of irrelevance is undecidability. This concerns whether information is
considered ‘true’ or ‘false’ [1]. Due to the lack of statistical data for predicting future
risks, project managers often rely on subjective estimates [24]. However, other
stakeholders may not believe in the credibility of these estimates. Hence, during the
phase of risk identification and risk analysis, stakeholders might disagree [25] over
which risks are considered to be ‘true’, with the result that some risks will be deemed as
not pertinent and, as a result, are excluded from any active management.
Few studies have investigated these types of ignorance, especially in the context of
project management. Although some studies have tried to address the importance of
malice of project managers managing risk, most of the evidence is descriptive and relies
on assumptions rather than on empirical findings [26, 27]. These findings thus lack
theoretical relevance. This study aims to address the limitation by providing empirical
evidence on the role of irrelevance in project risk management. As a result, in the light
of the lack of previous research, this study will shed some light on whether irrelevance
can be seen to manifest itself in IT project management and, if this is the case, the
nature of the impact irrelevance has on risk management in IT projects?
METHOD
This study used an exploratory approach in order to understand the ‘social reality’ of
project managers and how they experienced irrelevance in project risk management.
First, the research sought to confirm that the three types of irrelevance (undecidability,
taboo, untopicality) were experienced, and could be readily identified, in the everyday
working life by the research participants. When the different types of irrelevance had
been established, in the context of project risk management, questions were asked to
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probe their perceived impact on the effectiveness of project risk management processes
that were being employed in projects where the respondents were working. A further
aim of the investigation was to explore whether further types of deliberate ignorance
could be identified.
Due to the exploratory nature of the study, an interpretivist research approach was
adopted, employing face-to-face semi-structured interviews, guided by a topic rather
than a set of specific questions. The purpose of this was to allow an in-depth insight into
the lived reality of the research participants in their project environments. The
population from which the sample was drawn consisted of IT project managers who
were members of the PMI and the APM. For this study, non-probability sampling was
applied, because it is often more beneficial “to learn a lot from an atypical case than a
little from a magnificently typical case” [28]. Atypical in this study implies that cases
were chosen that revealed overall extreme difficulties which IT project managers faced
while managing project risks. The rationale for such a deliberative sampling method is
that extreme and atypical cases tend to give more information [28] and thus allowed the
phenomenon of intervening factors to become more ‘visible’. The sample size in the
exploratory phase of this study was determined by conceptual saturation. Saturation was
reached after 18 in-depth interviews when no new information or themes about
irrelevance were observed in the data. The profile of the sample in the exploratory
research is shown in Table 3:
Table 3: Profile of exploratory sample
Company Interviewee Project Position Approx. project
budget (£m)
Project duration
(months)
Company A Interviewee 1 Project 1 IT project manager 15 36
Company B Interviewee 2 Project 2 IT consultant 5 18
Company C Interviewee 3 Project 3 IT project manager 1 1
Company C Interviewee 4 Project 4 IT project manager 10 2
Company D Interviewee 5 Project 5 IT project manager 0.008 0.25
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Company E Interviewee 6 Project 6 IT project manager 18 12
Company F Interviewee 7 Project 7 IT project manager 1 12
Company G Interviewee 8 Project 8 IT project manager 30-40 18
Company H Interviewee 9 Project 9 IT project manager 3 14
Company I Interviewee 10 Project 10 IT project manager 7 18
Company J Interviewee 11 Project 11 IT project manager 10 18
Company J Interviewee 12 Project 12 IT project manager 150 48
Company J Interviewee 13 Project 13 IT project manager 1-2 1
Company J Interviewee 14 Project 14 IT project manager 40 6
Company J Interviewee 15 Project 15 IT project manager 100 6
Company J Interviewee 16 Project 16 IT project manager 1000 120
Company J Interviewee 17 Project 17 IT project manager 30 18
Company K Interviewee 18 Project 18 IT project manager 8 36
As can be seen in Table 3, some of the IT project managers work for the same company.
However, each interview related to a different project. In this study, the specific project
being discussed by the interviewees, and the interviewees themselves were independent
variables. Project risk management was the dependent variable. In this study, all the
interviewees were project managers, or senior members of the project team, who had
responsibility for implementing the project risk management process. Clearly, these
individuals had a particular, situated perspective which would differ from other project
actors and stakeholders (such as project owners/sponsors). For these other project
actors, the findings might well be different.
For the purpose of making sense of the qualitative data contained in the interview
transcripts, a template approach [29] was applied using a proprietary qualitative data
analysis software package. Some codes existed prior to the data analysis based on
Smithson’s taxonomy [1]. These served as main codes, within which sub codes
emerged. The characteristics of the main codes changed continuously up to the stage
where no data further illuminated coding (concept saturation).
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FINDINGS
Project managers were questioned about how they managed risk, whether it was
effective from their point of view and what difficulties they encountered. Those
highlighted difficulties that related to a deliberate inattention to risk were further
explored.
Untopicality
This was first type of irrelevance that emerged during the analysis. For example,
Interviewee 16 noted that project managers working in his project mainly focused on
technical risk, delaminating the range of risks to be considered:
“They looked purely on the implementation and not from a technical point of
view, they had not looked at it from a business point of view.” (Interviewee 16)
The decision to restrict the degree of information appears to focus on the perceived ease
of information processing. Risks are deemed pertinent that are actually ‘easy’ to
identify, analyse and respond to:
“We looked for risks that were easily identifiable, but didn't actually have
serious consequences for the project. The project was not really at threat from
these risks.” (Interviewee 1)
Some project managers identified that those risks that were easy to process were those
that may not have an actual impact on the project outcome and that softer behaviour
related risks should not be neglected:
“The other issue was putting these risks into words, because they're often soft
risks - the human factor. It is obviously easier to describe something technical. If
I say, 'OK, the lorry doesn't arrive. What do I do then? I'll send another lorry', I
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can put that into words and come up with this or that measure. It's a simple
process.” (Interviewee 1)
These examples show that project mangers focus on specific topics (e.g. on technical
risk) but declare other topics are irrelevant. Nevertheless, what causes untopicality in
project management and why do project managers declare risks outside their scope of
project risk management? This study seems to indicate that first, that project managers
accept that information that is easiest to process (perceived ease of risk management)
and not necessarily that which may be most critical (perceived usefulness of risk
management). A tame problem [30] receives more attention than wicked problem
because it
 has a relatively well-defined and stable problem statement.
 has a definite stopping point, i.e. we know when the solution or a solution is
reached.
 has a solution which can be objectively evaluated as being right or wrong.
 belongs to a class of similar problems which can be solved in a similar manner.
 has solutions which can be tried and abandoned.
Project managers are increasingly faced with problems of organised complexity,
clusters of interrelated or interdependent problems, or systems of problems. Problems
such as these, that cannot be solved in relative isolation from one another are messes.
Project managers sort out messes through systems methods and modelling, focusing on
processes and interdisciplinary approaches. Rather than simply breaking things down
into parts and fixing components, project managers examine the patterns of interactions
among parts, focusing on redundancy or irrelevance. Short [31] suggests: “All too often
such measures rest upon what can easily be counted, rather than on what is meaningful
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to those who are at risk, …”. Those risks that attract more attention than others may be
“unusually visible, sensational, and easy to imagine” [32]. Rothstein [33] mentions in
another context, that risk actors tended to focus on the better known and readily-
resolvable risks, obvious risks or these being perceived as legitimate. Hence, the
problem of wicked messes persists because managers continue to believe that there are
such things as unilateral causation and independent and dependent variables.
Undecidability
Unlike topicality, the salient characteristic of undecidability is the lack of agreement on
risks, expressed by one interviewee :
“We couldn't come to any opinion.” (Interviewee 5)
In some projects, project managers failed to agree on possible threats to the project
outcome, the likelihood that they would materialise and the appropriate response to
mitigate the risk. Reason for the lack of agreement was the degree of criticality
attributed to the risk. Risks that were not affected by third parties in a project were
considered less critical than those directly affecting oneself:
“In terms there are certain risks which they do not regard as high risk which we
would regard as being high risk. At the end of the day, it was our company's
name on the telephone that was put on the customer's desk so any issue about the
quality would directly affect us. It was not the partner's name so there was a
certain issue like closeness to the product which made us much more sensitive to
any potential issue that may come up and may be perceived to be a quality issue
with the technology. We thought that partner was less sensitive to that kind of
issue.” (Interviewee 10)
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The degree of undecidability or the inability to designate a risk as ‘true’ or ‘false’ was
also influenced by the notion of ‘hidden agendas’ or undisclosed conflicting objectives
between the project stakeholders.
“There was a large element of mistrust in this project. We had multiple
consultancies operating in the one consortium. Some of the consultancies were
natural competitors outside of this consortium and therefore within the
consortium there was a lot of mistrust. As a result, the client had a degree of
mistrust with regard to the various hidden agendas that might have been
operating within that consortium.” (Interviewee 13)
The lack of decidability on whether the message of risk is considered to be reliable,
legitimate, fair or the deliverer of the message to be open and forthcoming, consistent
honest, caring, concerned and competent [34], as well as the lack of ex-post decision
control at the ex-ante stage of predicting risks and planning responses to risk is likely to
lead to a ‘relative credibility’ of risks. This means that risk actors may perceive the
risk’s ‘true’ value differently. Among the interviewees who mentioned this, on their
projects no consensus was achieved among stakeholders about the credibility of risks.
The lack of consensus between risk actors’ perceptions of risk relates to disbelief or a
lack of faith in the message (risk) or the source of the message (person who produces
the risk) [20, 35, 36]; it is a question of trust [37].
Trust appears to be the root cause of risk conflicts [38] and disagreements about risk’s
true nature. The problem of mistrust is addressed by Ritchie and Marshall [39] who
argue: “There is a natural tendency to define a problem in such a way that the analytical
results are valid and credible. …, hazards which can be evaluated with confidence have
been given comparatively more attention than other hazards”. Hence, the disbelief in
risk by risk actors or the disbelief in the source of risk is likely to relate to the risk
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actors’ agreement on the management of risks that are clearer [40], more obvious and
controllable [41] or easier to measure [42]. The sometimes conflicting relative
credibility of risk estimates perceived by stakeholders tended to lead to lack of
cooperation.
Taboo
Some interviewees described risk as a taboo. Because it would entail the disclosure of
inconvenient information to project stakeholders, some risks were ignored. Taboos were
already considered beyond the pale at the bidding stage of the project:
“… anyway, we had to go through a tendering process at the start of the project
and, during this process, we presented ourselves in such a way that we would
seem as reasonable and competent as possible. And problems and risks don't go
down so well. We wanted to come across as people who could get the project
under way and complete it. The first aim was to win the tender, no matter what
the cost. In this sense, we had a somewhat unrealistic schedule.” (Interviewee 5)
“I think only to a limited extent, as we would probably have identified risks, but
they could never have been brought to the client's attention, because the priority
was simply the successful completion of the project.” (Interviewee 6)
“Not just unnerve them, but also lose the project, because there was very strong
competition from other providers.” (Interviewee 6)
As a result, in order to be viewed by stakeholders as competent as possible to deliver the
desired project outcome, project mangers sought to avoid being perceived as entities
who predicted calamity at every opportunity:
“I didn't want to be the doomsayer in the euphoric preliminary phase.”
(Interviewee 5)
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One way to reduce anxiety among stakeholders, that may arise through confronting
them with uncertainties with possible negative consequences, is to deliberately ignore
risks [43]. This choice of denial to or by stakeholders lies in the “freedom to choose
whether or not to expose oneself (and others) to the dangers which lie in the activity (of
risk management)” [44]. This would lead to the benefit of stakeholders (and by this we
particularly mean project owners or sponsors) not being confronted with uncertainty. As
a result of this apparent benefit (having to deal with the “fear of the unknown” [45])
individuals tend to be unwilling to manage risks [46]. Their unwillingness relates to the
temptation to give people the answers they want to hear, and the answers are apparent
certainty or a perception of a safe and predictable world [32, 43]. Because stakeholders
may perceive risk (management) to be a gloomy and negative affair [15] or because
stakeholders are more concerned with the exposure to potential adverse external opinion
of failure than with the possible impact of uncertainties on the project [47] they
downgrade their actual perceived risk to a desired external accepted level of risk [48]
that can be “safely” engaged through risk management without the side effects of
“dread”. Thus, in so far as risks that may have an influence on the project outcome are
suppressed, they are not managed for the sake of avoiding discomfort among
stakeholders.
Suspension of belief
The previous types of irrelevance are in line with Smithson’s [1] taxonomy of
irrelevance. This study provides a detailed consideration of their manifestation in the
context of project risk management. However, a further type of irrelevance emerged.
This type does not refer to a double or dubious ‘message’ (undecidability), or
information that is perceived as inconvenient (taboo), or to information that
stakeholders deem ‘out-of-scope’ (untopicality). Rather, this was where risk-related
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information was regarded as being ‘useless’ because it did not have an immediate effect
on the project. This was brought up by a number of interviewees, for example:
“In this particular environment, it was one that was used to "flying by the seats of its
pants" and managing issues and crisis as they arrived rather than actually taking the
time and stand back and look ahead and say "What can we do to prevent that?".”
(Interviewee 5)
“In that particular organisation, once a risk had transpired it was all hands to the
pump and they did what needed doing. That was the culture of the organisation to
fire fight and run by crisis management.” (Interviewee 14)
Hence, the project managers distanced themselves from this type of information
because the perception was that they were dealing with some kind of ‘fiction’. They did
not want to expend resources on dealing with anything other than ‘facts’:
… if it did [risk materialised], we could get round it somehow (Interviewee 1)
Whereas on the one hand, some stakeholders’ preference lies in identifying, analysing
and responding in advance, other stakeholders appear to wait until risk resolves itself
[49] and to react to actual materialising risks. Smallman [50] summarises the apparent
emphasis of risk actors on reactive risk management: “It is hardly surprising that
reactive risk management is dominant at the present time; it is, apparently, more certain
and easier to manage and cost than the holistic approach.” Their preference may lie in
saving costs and time by reducing the scope of risk management rather than trying to
manage all possible risks with the purpose of reducing the possibility of adverse
consequences on the project objectives of cost, scope and time [51].
Executing actions to mitigate risks requires the commitment of resources, such as time
and money. Resources are committed in advance to respond to risks that are not certain
to occur but the client/owner or sponsor may be unwilling to spend money and energy
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on a management process without knowing it has definite benefits [23]. Raz and
Michael [3] mention: “One of the reasons we included this part is that we met many
project managers who claimed that risk management was an unnecessary activity, and
that the resources it required could be put to better use elsewhere in the project.” As a
consequence, referring to the concept off ‘satisficing’ [52], project managers tended to
meet the criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify the optimal solution. Information
was not deemed pertinent because what can be done now to resolve a fictional problem
is considered to require greater resources than doing something about facts. Possible
explanations for ‘satisficing’ maybe a myopic propensity towards project efficiency.
Project managers are nonchalant about risk related information because although the
costs of taking actions to manage ‘fictional’ risk are immediately visible, the effect of
threats that may or may not impact the project outcome is not.
As a working definition, this new project management related type of irrelevance is
described as the act of suspending one’s belief in risk related information and refers to
placing such information at a lower order. This type of irrelevance is different to
undecidability. If we assume that knowledge claims about a risk remain intact, that is to
say, risk actors share a common belief that a risk is ‘true’, claims are still suspended
because the utility (e.g. defined by cost, time, comfort, convenience, habits etc.) to do
something about it now is perceived to be lower than the utility to deal with information
once it is confirmed by ‘real’ events.
Irrelevance and perceived effectiveness of project risk management
We have identified four types of irrelevance (as a subset of ignorance) that have impacts
of the management of risks in projects. Three could be correlated to Smithson’s [1]
taxonomy and to these we added ‘suspension of belief’. We found that they were
present in many of the projects mentioned by the interviewees and that, in some cases,
the interviewees had experienced several types of irrelevance on the same project.
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However, we also wanted to examine the impact of irrelevance on the effectiveness of
project risk management.
21
Table 4 presents data on the perceived effectiveness of management activity at six
stages in the risk management process. We have used a code to indicate the nature of
the effect and then indicated the types of irrelevance that were identified in each case.
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Table 4: Summed indices - perceived effectiveness of project risk management stages and related
types of error and irrelevance
Project Planning Identify
Threat
Attach
Probability
Determine
Effects
Evaluate
Response
Determine
Response
Owner
Execute
Actions
Irrelevance
Interviewee1 NA X ↑ ↑ X X
S, UT, UD
Interviewee 2 NA X X ↑ NA NA ↑
UT, UD, T
Interviewee 3 NA ↑ ↑ NA ↑ ↑
Interviewee 4 NA ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ X
Interviewee 5 X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n S
Interviewee 6 X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n T
Interviewee 7 ↑ X NA
UD
Interviewee 8 ↑ X X X X X X
UD, UT
Interviewee 9 ↑ X X ↑ X ↑
T, UT
Interviewee 10 ↑ ↑ X ↑ ↑ X
UD, UT
Interviewee 11 ↑ X X X X NA X
S
Interviewee 12 ↑ X X X X
S
Interviewee 13 NA X X NA X X X UD, UT, T
Interviewee 14 NA ↑ X NA NA X X
S
Interviewee 15 ↑ NA ↑
Interviewee 16 X ↑ X ↑ X NA
UT
Interviewee 17 NA X NA NA NA X X S
Interviewee 18 X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n X - n T
Perceived effectiveness:
↑ = Effective
X = Not effective
X - n = no effectiveness - No project risk management applied
NA = Data not available
Blank = No unambiguous effectiveness cited
Irrelevance:
UT- Untopicality
S – Suspension (Cost/Time)
T – Taboo
UD – Undecideablity
Without ignoring the influence of error on the perceived effectiveness of project risk
management, irrelevance seemed to adversely influence the process of the management
of risk on the projects our interviewees mentioned. In particular, the inability to decide
whether risk related information was true or false was found to be of concern when
analysing probabilities. Meanwhile, taboos seemed to have an impact on the phase of
planning the risk management process and identifying threats. Elsewhere, untopicality
became a problem at the stage of defining a response owner. We found suspension of
belief manifested itself as a type of cost/time subordination, which had an impact right
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at the outset in deciding whether or not to apply a formal risk management process.
Once, the decision was taken subordination reduced the capability of a project manager
to define response alternatives and to ultimately execute actions. Overall, due to the
influence of irrelevance at various stages of the project risk management process, the
capability of some project managers to manage risk seemed to be reduced to a ‘tick-
box’ exercise with little significance on the actual mitigation of risk:
“… people would see it merely as putting a tick in the box. Yes, we are doing a
project risk assessment.” (Interviewee 13)
“…it becomes an administrative process and as long people feel there is a risk
register somewhere and lip services paid to in on a reasonably frequent basis that
they are managing risk.” (Interviewee 17)
Risk related information is processed because project manager are supposed to follow
the formal procedures despite a feeling of powerlessness and alienation. In the extreme,
fatalistic tendencies resulted in pure defiance and a resistance to apply any form of
proactive management of risk (in, for example, the cases of interviewees 5, 6 and 18).
The management of relevance
Although ignorance, in the form of irrelevance, may not arise in all projects but may
potentially arise in any given project, this study has highlighted how established types
of irrelevance manifest themselves in project management, together with another
category which we called suspension of belief. Coping with ignorance requires
responding to errors and irrelevancies. This study has allowed an extended
understanding of ignorance in project management so that strategies can be
implemented to help optimise project risk management process. This entails the
management of relevance.
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Whereas error requires clarification, exactitude and rectification through enquiry,
irrelevance in project risk management can be overcome through the management of
relevance that defines the extent of information exclusion. The overall aim of the
management of relevance is limiting the exclusion of risk and ultimately to reduce
fatalistic tendencies in project risk management. Barriers of untopicaility,
undecidability, taboo and suspension of belief have to be overcome. From the data, it
would appear that when addressing risk information, managers are most likely to
consider topicality first, then truthfulness and finally utility. Against these concepts we
have mapped the four categories of irrelevance, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A multi stage process of relevance evaluation [30]
First, untopicality requires stakeholders to define a common scope of risk management.
This may include the mindfulness of being able to only process tame risks and that
wicked messes are to be excluded. Defining a common nominator for what type of
threats stakeholders are looking for prevents risks being ‘off-topic’ and therefore
irrelevant.
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Once risks have been defined as ‘on topic’ and a common view as emerged of what
scope is acceptable, trust has to been built up that allows an agreement on what risks are
considered ‘true’ and which ‘false’. If a common belief in the nature of project risk is
not gained, it may be decided to gain further data in order to engage establish why risks
are seen as incomplete and irrelevant.
The final stage relates to the evaluation of utility. Considering time and cost constraints,
project managers evaluate the usefulness of risk information. Preferences to mitigate
risk, to prevent anxiety by disclosing damaging information to oneself or other
stakeholders and the propensity towards myopic efficiency are prioritised and ultimately
determine the degree of relevance of project risks in IT projects regardless of their
objective degree of error.
The management of relevance proposes a determination of relevance and to which
extent risk related information is excluded in a world characterised by uncertain
boundaries. Almost every risk may be of interest, but the management of risk requires
information about threat, probability and response. Current project risk management
processes do not propose any prescriptive process to define the relevance of risk apart
from a ranking of risks according to their threat and their likelihood of occurrence. The
discovered four principles and their management may guide a project manager to first,
to create awareness about irrelevance and second, how to overcome it.
There are two major limitations of this study. First, the sample of the second phase of
exploration which included a narrow segment of IT project managers. Second, limited
generalisabilty arises through the use of subjective data. In particular, the IT project
manager’s reality which has been investigated in this study may not be transferable to
other individuals. As a consequence, tendencies which have emerged and been explored
cannot be generalised beyond the chosen sample cluster. As a result, it may be
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worthwhile to determine whether the same types of irrelevance prevail in other types of
projects and in what form.
CONCLUSIONS
Project risk management with its assumptions of ‘hyper rationality’ excludes many
aspects of managerial behaviour. Organisations such as the Project Management
Institute or the Association of Project Management claim that through the identification,
analysis and response to risk, project managers can achieve planned project outcomes.
Little research has been undertaken to ascertain whether project managers involved in
risk management activity perceive the self-evidently correct processes and procedures
they implement to be effective. There seems to be far more literature offering
prescriptions to project managers on how to manage risk in project rather than assess
the relative effectiveness of those prescriptions. Neither the shortcomings of current
project risk management processes nor options to change and/or expand those best
practice standards to include behavioural aspects of irrelevance have received much
attention in literature so far. As long as no evidence is produced, whether project risk
management actually helps project managers from their point of view (‘doing things
right’), the acceptance of best practice project risk management standards is at stake
(‘doing the right things’).
The findings of this study show that in some projects, project risk management is
conditioned by deliberate ignorance of project managers. The factors of untopicality,
undecidabilty and utility of risk related information characterised by taboos and
suspension of belief appear to demote risk management to an administrative exercise
having no or only little impact on the project outcome. Indeed, if irrelevance remains
unattended by project managers, project risk management might turn out to be not only
ineffective but also counterproductive.
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The research undertaken involved projects specifically from the IT industry and, as
such, the extent to which the findings are more generally applicable to, say, engineering,
construction or change projects is open to question. The specific nature of the project
(industrial sector, complexity, size, etc.[53]) is less likely to be an issue. Rather, the
generalisability would, in this case, be limited by the character of the social conditions
found in different project types. We would argue that it is the social conditions (such as
organizational and, maybe, national culture) that would govern the response of project
actors to the way they regard the relevance of project risk information. The question
then becomes one of whether projects from, for example, different industries, or
projects of differing complexities, have different cultures. Future research could
examine this question as well as seek to validate the categories of irrelevance across a
wider sample of projects.
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